INTRODUCTION
The right to the truth is on an upward trajectory in international law and it is widely discussed in relation to conflict and authoritarianism.
1 Its modern origins can be found in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American other contexts where state policies limit human rights, for instance as part of counter-terror practices (e.g.
Grand Chamber judgment of El-Masri v FYRM 8 )
. 9 These developments call for a reappraisal of the right to the truth as part of international human rights law (IHRL).
In the aftermath of widespread -and often symbolic -human rights abuses connected to conflict and authoritarianism, individual victims and society at large reckon with the past in many ways to acknowledge harm and identify those responsible. Truth seeking initiatives such as trials and truth commissions contribute to the formation of collective memories, which can then become the object of further debates about the past.
But top-down initiatives alone are likely to marginalise some victim accounts and disempower minority or counter-establishment views. The right to the truth offers survivors a tool to instigate truth-seeking processes though an actionable right to hold authorities accountable for effective investigations. This right, however, remains elusive. Building on the last comprehensive study of the right to the truth in 2006 by Yasmin Naqvi, 10 this article takes stock of recent developments of this right and explores what they mean globally.
Specifically, this research presents a fresh analysis of the right to the truth in light of new ECHR case law and examines its impact on its international formulation. The paper evaluates the growing consistency around the contours of the right to the truth and the extent to which it has evolved in public international law (PIL). The first part traces the evolution of the right to the truth in global and regional sources, providing a comparative study of Inter-American and European human rights case law. Two distinct but intertwined themes are analysed: firstly, the connection between the state's duty to investigate and survivors' right to know the past through an actionable right; and secondly, the link between the individual and collective dimensions of the right to the truth. The second part discusses what these developments mean in international law, and considers whether existing legal categories (customary international law (CIL) and general principles of law) are suited to the formalisation of the right to the truth. The findings suggest that regardless its formal characterisation, the repeated and varied uses of the right to the truth demonstrate its importance and benefits. 
THE STATUS AND CONTOURS OF THE RIGHT TO THE TRUTH
The discovery of truth about past harm through formal legal proceedings 11 is inherently permeable to uneven power structures that impact truth seeking initiatives such as trials and truth commissions. Existing laws may (deliberately or not) include and privilege the accounts of some groups and marginalise others. 12 Through the applications of the right to the truth, victims and survivors can attempt to challenge prevailing versions of history and compel authorities to investigate and make public contested accounts of the past. Framing the need to know as a right empowers individuals to instigate truth-seeking processes directly. This, in turn, may help broaden perspectives during truth seeking processes, and ensure greater inclusivity in building collective memories.
The slow recognition of the right to the truth and its uneven application across the world calls for a study of its sources and development in order to understand its contours, normative status and value. Its origins have been traced in International Humanitarian Law (IHL): 13 Article 32 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions refers to the 'right of families to know the fate of their relatives', both with respect to the remains of the deceased (Article 34) and for missing persons (Article 33). 14 But its application is limited to armed conflicts, excluding the full range of situations in which serious violations occur (including authoritarianism).
Moreover, IHL lacks easily justiciable rights that individuals may action to uncover the truth about past harm, as well as appropriate tools to deal with non-state actors.
In international criminal law (ICL), the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) provides only a 'limited realisation' of the right to the truth, restricted to the 'context of enforced disappearances (Article 7(1)(i))'. 15 Although, in principle, it could accommodate this right, costly and largely ineffective victim 11 The concept of the 'legal truth' is complex and cannot be discussed exhaustively in this article. Here, is used to describe information about past harm elicited as part of formal (legal) proceedings. participation schemes 16 suggest that ICL is not yet ripe for operationalising victims' right to the truth.
Moreover, the punitive nature of criminal law exacerbates tensions between justice served -i.e. convictionsand justice understood more broadly, in which accountability and punishment for past abuses could be uncoupled.
Today, the right to the truth -as presented in the language of rights -most closely relates to IHRL. It is framed as a right 'in relation to other fundamental human rights by human rights bodies and courts' and referred to as such in truth seeking mechanisms. 17 Since the Eighties and Nineties the UN Human Rights Committee has considered cases about disappearances, death in police custody, prison torture and arbitrary detention in the contexts of authoritarianism and civil conflict in light of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights
. 18 This right is now being channelled and developed through the work of the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence, whose 2013 Report clearly states that the right to the truth is 'enshrined in a number of international instruments'.
19
Building on existing sources, the 2013 Report by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth frames the current UN understanding of the right to the truth within the scope of human rights. The Report sets out a state requirement to 'establish institutions, mechanisms and procedures that are enabled to lead to the revelation of the truth', described as 'a process to seek information and facts about what has actually taken place, to contribute to the fight against impunity, to the reinstatement of the rule of law, and ultimately to 16 Each victim has the right to know the truth regarding the circumstances of the enforced disappearance, the progress and results of the investigation and the fate of the disappeared person.
The right to the truth, however, extends beyond the specific instance of disappearance, as evidenced in Human
Rights Commission and Human Rights Council resolutions; 22 for example, it may be used to uncover information about confirmed killings and structural violence against certain ethnic or political groups. The
UN Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to
Combat Impunity (Orentlicher Principles) already acknowledged the broad scope of the right to the truth:
Every people has the inalienable right to know the truth about past events concerning the perpetration of heinous crimes and about the circumstances and reasons that led, through massive or systematic violations, to the perpetration of those crimes. This suggests that while the right to the truth is not listed in the IACHR, it is more than a procedural corollary to an existing right: it can be actioned in conjunction with an enumerated right but it also carries a special weight of its own as a cross-cutting principle.
To counter attempts to forget about the past and move on, the IACHR system has clarified that Article 13 33 is crucial to 'delivering' the right to the truth to family members and society as a whole, as opposed to amnesties. 34 The IACtHR has stated that amnesty laws pose an obstacle to the right to the truth, 35 The second aspect to consider is the overlap between individual and collective functions of the right to the truth, understood as serving interests beyond the parties to a case.
Lucio Parada Cea et al v El Salvador
describes the right to the truth as a:
Collective right which allows a society to gain access to information essential to the development of democratic systems, and also an individual right for the relatives of the victims, allowing for a form of reparation.
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The notorious Villagran-Morales et al. v Guatemala (street children case) case also provides a pertinent example of the importance for society at large to uncover the truth about the state's role in abuse. 37 The inextricable connection between the individual and collective right to know became apparent in the highprofile case of the political assassination of Monsignor Oscar Romero, Archbishop of El Salvador. The
Commission found that the state's failure to investigate the circumstances of extra-judicial killing constituted a violation of its duty to reveal the truth to both the victim's family as well as to society at large. 38 It specified that an investigation:
Must be undertaken in good faith and must be diligent, exhaustive and impartial and geared to exploring all possible lines of investigation that make it possible to identify the perpetrators of the crime, so that they can be tried and punished.
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The IACtHR had already outlined the requirements of investigations in Velásquez Rodríguez:
[investigations] must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective.
An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government. of the right to the truth, understood as a violation of the rights contained in Articles 8, 13 and 25 of the Convention' to the state obligation to 'demonstrat[e] that they have taken all the measures at their disposal to prove that the requested information does not exist'. 42 The case also highlighted the importance of the state's positive obligation to investigate in 'democratic societies', in which 'every individual, including the next of kin of the victims of grave human rights violations' has 'the right to know the truth, so that they and society as a whole must be informed on what happened'. 43 Contreras, therefore, illustrates how the IACHR has continued, over time, to consider serious investigations in light of the right to the truth, understood as an individual and a collective matter.
So while there is a direct, actionable right to the truth held by individuals affected by the violation, and the corresponding state duty to uncover the past through investigations, trials and other truth seeking mechanisms, the state must also respond to the need for the general public and society at large to know what happened.
IACtHR jurisprudence thus establishes that the state obligation to investigate is relevant beyond the parties to individual cases, because truths uncovered contribute to constructing collective memories and inform political debates.
(b) ECHR Contributions to the Right to the Truth
In contrast to the Inter-American system, 'the right to truth has been comparatively slow to develop' in the Council of Europe system. 44 torture), dealing with the enforced disappearance and ill-treatment of the applicant, as well as the subsequent lack of effective state investigations.
The El-Masri judgment and concurring opinions 'cautiously expand the function of the state duty to undertake a credible investigation', setting 'a novel standard to secure accountability of human rights violations committed in other national security cases and beyond ' . 47 Yet all the judgment says about the right to the truth is that 'inadequate investigations' had an 'impact on the right to the truth'. 48 For the substantive discussion on the right to the truth, the concurring opinions offer valuable insights into the debate between judges about this right in relation to the ECHR and international law more generally. The key issues explored the status of the right to the truth within the scope of the ECHR, whether it constitutes a new right, its relationship to the duty to investigate, and who holds it.
In the separate opinion 49 of judges Tulkens, Spielmann, Sicilianos and Keller (Tulkens et al), the right to the truth is described as a 'well-established reality' which is 'far from being either innovative or superfluous'. in the ECHR and the Court's case law, 56 dismissing the idea that the right to the truth merits attention either as an extension of Convention provisions or as a novel human right. Contrary to Tulkens et al, Casadevall et al argued that it was not necessary to address the right to the truth 'as something different from, or additional to, the requisites already established in such matters' in previous case law, 57 concluding that 'a separate analysis of the right to the truth becomes redundant'. Yet this reductionist approach seems disconnected from the evolution of the right to the truth elsewhere. A closer analysis of the Court's case law suggests that the substance of the right to the truth, which includes the state duty to investigate and the collective dimension of knowing about past abuse, is nothing new in Strasbourg. However, the ECtHR is yet to formulate a coherent analysis of the right to the truth: its jurisprudence and separate opinions on the issue reveal the Court's interest and ambiguity towards this emerging principle. The two key aspects to consider in assessing the Court's position on the right to the truth are its relationship to the state duty to investigate and its individual and collective dimensions.
(i) The Right to the Truth and the State Duty to Investigate
The right to the truth is connected to the 'right to know what happened'. 58 ECtHR jurisprudence has long consolidated the state duty to investigate violations, 59 echoing the substance of the positive obligation to investigate set out by in IACHR jurisprudence in relation to the right to the truth. In El-Masri, the Grand
Chamber traced a link between the lack of an effective investigation and the right to the truth, noting in relation to the procedural limb of Article 3:
Another aspect of the inadequate character of the investigation in the present case, namely its impact on the right to the truth regarding the relevant circumstances of the case.
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This landmark reference to right to the truth requires analysing in conjunction with the state duty to investigate across various contexts considered in recent judgments. 64 In order to be effective, investigations must be carried out by persons independent from those implicated in the events, and be 'capable of ascertaining the circumstances' and determining whether the force used was justified, and identifying and punishing those responsible. This requires 'promptness and reasonable expedition', accessibility to family members and some public scrutiny.
With regard to Article 3, investigations into alleged ill-treatment should be thorough and prompt, and 'in principle be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of the case' and identifying and punishing those responsible. 65 Moreover, there must be 'a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results', suggesting that investigations matter to the parties to the case but also to society at large. 61 The context of this case is described as 'dans le cas de l'usage massif de la force meurtrière à l'encontre de la population The criteria to assess the effectiveness of investigations were listed again in the recent Grand Chamber judgment, Mocanu (on the violent crackdown on anti-government demonstrations in Romania). 66 While the Court did not address the right to the truth explicitly, it built on previous jurisprudence and on Articles 2, 3
and 6(1) to restate the requirements of effective investigations: independence, expedition and adequacy of the investigation, as well as the victim's next of kin participation in the process. This judgment also considered the importance of investigations in the presence of numerous other similar cases:
The number of violations found in cases similar to the present case is a matter of particular concern and casts serious doubt on the objectivity and impartiality of the investigations. (ii) The Individual and Collective Dimensions of the Right to the Truth
As noted, the right to the truth carries a collective element. Intervening as a third party in Al Nashiri v Poland (subsequent to El-Masri), the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism clarified the UN understanding of the right to the truth as having 'two dimensions -a private dimension and a public dimension'. 71 Indeed, 'where gross or systematic human rights violations were alleged to have occurred, the right to know the truth was not one that belonged solely to the immediate victim but also to society'. Importantly, he outlined that recognising a 'free standing right to truth belonging to society at large' gave 'any individual with a legitimate interest in the truth' the entitlement to invoke that right. 72 72 Ibid.
the right to truth were to be confined to the individual who had suffered the violation or his representatives, then the exposure of grave and systematic international crimes would necessarily be dependent on the chance occurrence of there being an individual victim or relative who was able and willing to bring proceedings.
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The Special Rapporteur's words, reported in the Al Nashiri judgment, indicate the Court's awareness of the collective dimension of the right to the truth, in addition its importance for direct victims and relatives.
According to the Grand Chamber in El-Masri, the 'right to know what happened', as linked to the right to the truth, is relevant to the victim (applicant), whose Convention rights are allegedly violated and who has standing before the Court; his family; 'other victims of similar crimes'; and the 'general public'. 74 The broader understanding of the category of victims echoes established IACHR jurisprudence. Moreover, in El-Masri, the ECtHR stated:
The great importance of the present case not only for the applicant and his family, but also for other victims of similar crimes and the general public, who had the right to know what had happened.
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The importance for the victim's family to know about the past through an enquiry is established in the Court's 78 Ibid, paras 142-145; In particular para 143: Or, "l'obligation procédurale découlant de l'article 2 de la Convention peut difficilement être considérée comme accomplie lorsque les familles des victimes ou leurs héritiers n'ont pas pu avoir accès à une procédure devant un tribunal indépendant appelé à connaître des faits".
reactions and attitudes to the situation when it is brought to their attention' (linking to Articles 2, 3 and 5 The investigation must be accessible to the victim's family to the extent necessary to safeguard their legitimate interests.
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The collective dimension of the right to the truth expands the purpose of the state's obligation to investigate.
While it is established that victims and close relatives are entitled to make a legal claim, the general public's interest in knowing the truth about widespread abuse that affects large portions of society contributes an additional, distinct dimension to the right to the truth. This interest can take a variety of forms. In Association 21 Décembre the judges considered that 'the public must have a sufficient right to examine (droit de regard) the investigation or its findings, in order to challenge (mise en cause)' it both in practice and in theory, depending on each case. 82 Moreover, the general public may also want to know what emerged from those investigations through a related 'right to access relevant information about alleged violations', as noted by
Tulkens et al in their concurring opinion in El-Masri. 83 This connects the right to the truth to the right to access information of public interest also emerging in the Court's jurisprudence.
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In essence, when harm has affected society collectively, the right to the truth acquires significance for groups beyond persons directly affected. of the collective dimension of the right to the truth: in certain instances, knowing the past is clearly relevant to society at large in principle, but in practice only a small number of claimants may be entitled to take legal action. As such, the right to the truth as a collective matter strengthens the right to know held by specific individuals and groups, but the Court is yet to afford a clear, actionable right to the truth to satisfy that collective dimension.
The second concurring opinion in El-Masri adopted this more conservative position, arguing that it is 'the victim, and not the general public' who is entitled to know, regardless of the general public's interest (and curiosity) towards the case. 94 So while not completely dismissing the fact that certain cases are significant beyond the parties to the dispute, Casadevall and Lopez Guerra considered the interest of society at large as irrelevant under the law. But this more conservative approach seems to completely miss the distinctive collective aspect of the right to the truth, especially when the outcome of a case is likely to affect large sections of society. The right to the truth is more that the state obligation to investigate: in some cases, finding out about past abuses is a public concern, in addition to being a specific entitlement of persons who enjoy victim status. the Court is not only dealing yet again with the rights of the applicant, but also finds itself at the centre of a complex social process in a society seeking to establish the truth about the past and its painful events. Nevertheless, in connection to the right to the truth emerging in the ECHR system, victims are able to hold states accountable for conducting inquiries into the circumstances and responsibilities for past abuse and instigate inquiries themselves. This serves the interests of the rule of law and human rights in general, as well as public confidence in state institutions, which affects the whole of society. At the same time, the outcomes of formal truth seeking informs the dynamic process of building, undoing and contesting the formation of collective memories in contexts of competing narratives. As such, identifying the contours of the right to the truth and its status in global IHRL, and making it justiciable, may help empower survivors of abuse and rebuild political communities recovering from violent histories. The ECtHR's gradual process of recognition of the right to the truth seems encouraging for its further consolidation and actionability. Moreover, the position of the European human rights system is significant beyond its jurisdictional boundaries, strengthening the development of the right to the truth internationally.
THE STATUS OF THE RIGHT TO THE TRUTH IN PIL
A decade ago Yasmin Naqvi considered whether the right to the truth is emerging as 'something approaching a customary right' (CIL) or a general principle of law, 105 concluding that it stood 'somewhere on the threshold of a legal norm and a narrative device'. Today, these claims can be reassessed in light of new developments in ECHR jurisprudence on the right to the truth. Indeed, since the Strasbourg judges have drawn on UN and IACHR developments and started to explore applications of this principle in Europe, the right to the truth is being used across different jurisdictions, and this is significant for its status in international law more generally.
But, in the absence of clear conventional status in PIL, does it reach the threshold of CIL or general principles?
Turning to the significance of the recent ECHR jurisprudence in the global debates, this part will consider how this contributes to the evolution and formalisation of the right to the truth internationally. The recent developments in ECHR jurisprudence adding to IACHR and UN advancements call for an overall reassessment of the right to the truth in relation to CIL through its two constitutive elements. For the purpose of this analysis, and in the absence of state statements against the right to the truth elaborating on opinio juris, the role of the ECtHR will be interpreted as relevant to regional CIL and significant for international custom more generally.
With regards to the significance of Strasbourg's jurisprudence in relation to IHRL (and PIL more broadly), the ECHR operates in the context of the rest of IHRL. Consequently, it is permeable to global human rights trends and ECtHR case law feeds back into those developments. 115 The ECHR jurisprudence carries normative value both within its regional jurisdiction and beyond, 120 and contributes to 'international legal culture' by providing important 'elucidation and development of international law' as well as developing 'principles of general applicability'. 121 Jointly with the IACHR, the ECtHR gives regional effect to general IHRL principles that may otherwise remain non-justiciable for rightsbearers. Thus, dialogue between regional human rights courts informs global human rights developments, including the right to the truth.
of IHRL. 125 Thus, the ECHR plays a 'key role' in IHRL and PIL, which is desirable, argues Wildhaber, 'if it contributes to the evolution of international law at large' and furthers human rights. 126 The Court has relied on international law to determine 'the effect of some substantive provisions of the Convention' and looked at global developments to interpret and apply it. 127 Yet, 'unlike international treaties of the classic kind' it creates 'more than mere reciprocal engagements between contracting States' and establishes obligations that benefit from 'collective enforcement'. 128 The ECHR's special character as a treaty for the collective enforcement of human rights and fundamental freedoms 129 (and related democratic intent . 132 Yet this reading is far from unanimous. 133 Another indicator for tracing the establishment of CIL norms proposed by Meron is the 'degree to which a statement of a particular right in one human rights instrument, especially a human rights treaty, has been repeated in other human rights instruments', countered by 'the degree to which a particular right is subject to limitations'. 134 Meron (and others 135 ) posit that regional human rights courts may also contribute to the customary formation and interpretation of IHRL, especially through the 'cumulative weight of their case-law' in influencing and consolidating developments of customary human rights law. 136 Moreover, the jurisprudence of regional human rights bodies is 'frequently and increasingly invoked outside the context of their constitutive instruments and cited as authoritative statements of human rights law'; taken cumulatively, this 'has a significant role in generating customary rules'. 137 The notion of the right to the truth has indeed been repeated across different fora, including the ECtHR.
But the extent to which new developments around the right to the truth at ECHR level and the cross-referencing consolidate this right in relation to CIL remains unclear -primarily because the understanding of regional courts' contribution to the formation of CIL remains under-theorised in light of the two constituent elements.
As such, and despite recent ECHR developments, qualifying the right to the truth as CIL would be imprecise.
(b) The Right to the Truth and General Principles
Alternatively, the increasing references to right to the truth across different fora could be interpreted as indicating an emerging general principle of law 'as recognised by civilised nations'. 138 Naqvi suggested that jurisprudence of human rights courts may indicate a nascent general principle; more specifically, procedural obligations that address violations of fundamental rights are emerging as 'an expected response by a state to a violation'. 139 Despite its colonial heritage, 140 and contested meaning, 141 general principles of international law may offer 'a means to resolve a variety of issues which neither conventional nor customary international law' are able to address, for example in developing human rights. 142 For Simma and Alston, the notion of general principles admits a situation in which a '[human rights] norm invested with strong inherent authority is widely accepted even though widely violated'. 143 In the absence of treaty provisions, this offers 'a more plausible explanation of how substantive human rights obligations may be established in general international law, than that offered by a strained, or even denatured "new" theory of custom'. 144 Considering both national and international sources of general principles, Cherif Bassiouni posited that 'comparative legal technique' offers an 'objective test to measure breadth and depth of recognition and applicability of a given principle in national legal systems' 145 -and by extension, in international (including regional) contexts. Therefore, the more a principle (to a degree of sameness) 'is reiterated in national and international sources, the more it deserves deference'. 146 A comparative analysis of the right to the truth across the UN, IACHR and ECHR mechanisms may thus signal a right under general principles. General principles are mentioned twice in the ECHR text 147 and it has been argued that drafters 'saw the use of general principles as inevitable' as 'part of the fundamental legal fabric'. 148 This indicates 'a process in which the resources of principles of international law remains unclear. As such, it seems premature to bestow the character of general principle of law to the right to the truth based on the recent developments.
And yet, lack of clarity as to the formal contours of the right to the truth does not detract from that fact it is being referred to and used to provide an actionable tool for some victims and survivors, with an important function for societies at large. Perhaps in the future, gradual repeated references to the right to the truth will be (borrowing from Koskenniemi) 'formulated in non-controversial language' giving the principle 'good chance' of acceptance 'as part of the discursive stuff out of which international law is made'. the ECtHR has also referred to the right to the truth in relation to institutional patterns of human rights abuse in the context of counterterror measures (El-Masri, Al-Nashiri), historic mass violence (Janowiec, Vasiliauskas), more recent conflicts (Aslakhanova), and current debates about past abuses (Perinçek) in relation to a range of ECHR articles. The UN itself, while originally focusing on disappearances, has also broadened the scope of applicability of the right to the truth to a range of contexts.
This evidence points to the fact that while falling short of a formal status under PIL, the right to the truth is being used productively across different international contexts and fora. An innovative way of interpreting these increasing -and cumulative -references could be as 'performative utterances' that do not merely describe an existing legal principle but actually constitute it. 154 In light of J.L. Austin's theory of performativity, the repetition of the expression 'right to the truth' by different actors, at different times, in different contexts indicates a statement that is not true or false (accurate or inaccurate) as such. 155 Instead, this succession of performative utterances is constitutive of the right to the truth in international law, regardless of whether it meets the formal criteria of a CIL norm or a general principle of law.
The turn to an extra-legal theoretical framework to understand the status of the right to the truth in international law can help illustrate its importance in practice, without forcing a premature characterisation through formal sources of PIL. Through Austin's theory of performativity, the right to the truth can be interpreted as being constituted in international law through repeated utterances in different fora, which cumulatively elevate this right's global significance and standing. Furthermore, recognising that the right to the truth is already performed in two regional human rights courts (albeit to differing degrees) and within the UN system might also contribute to the formal processes of formation of general international law. This supports the theses of human rights developments through general principles of law put forward by Bassiouni -as evidence of his comparative legal technique -and by Simma and Alston as a new norm invested with strong inherent authority.
The ultimate test for the status of the right to the truth in international law, however, is whether it will continue to be used (performed) for practical purposes to allow victims and societies to find out about past violence and ensure accountability of those responsible for harm.
CONCLUSIONS
154 See JL Austin, How to do things with words (Oxford: OUP, 1962) 155 Ibid, 12
Since Naqvi's analysis of the status of the right to the truth in international law a decade ago, the ECtHR has joined the conversation previously heralded by the IACHR and the UN. The recent case law, and in particular the El-Masri judgment, adds to the growing recognition of the right to the truth, and contributes to how it is understood both regionally and in its global evolution. Taking stock of this development, this article considers the significance of recent ECHR jurisprudence in consolidating the right to the truth regionally and internationally, and reflects on the contours and status of this right in general international law.
A survey of recent Strasbourg case law indicates that much like in the IACHR jurisprudence, the ECtHR has considered the right to the truth through two distinct, yet related, issues: the link between the right to the truth and the state duty to investigate, and the individual and collective dimensions of the right to know about the past in the context of widespread violations that affect society as a whole. The discussion also brings to light the connection between the right to the truth and democracy building after conflict and authoritarianism, as well as in relation to authoritarian practices in established democracies. In that regard, a more clearly defined right to the truth is desirable inasmuch as it helps strengthen the rule of law and promotes confidence in public institutions, as well as contributing to the formation of narratives that feed into wider debates about legacies of violence and abuse at domestic, regional and international levels.
In the quest for a more formal recognition of the right to the truth, it may be tempting to characterise it as a CIL norm or a general principle of law to give it greater authority. Yet despite the significant developments of the past decade that call for a reassessment since Naqvi's study, the right to the truth has still not reached formal standing in PIL based on the sources set out in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. Nevertheless, this does not detract from the substance and usefulness of the right to the truth: its repeated uses across different fora can be interpreted as performative utterances that contribute to its practical existence in international law. Regardless of its formal status under PIL, its uses indicate its growing significance regionally as well as internationallywith great domestic potential as well. As such, the upward trajectory of the right to the truth should continue to be closely monitored; and, most importantly, there should be no hesitation in actioning this right by those seeking the truth about widespread abuse, in order to hold authorities to account.
